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Perception as Unconscious Interference*
Abstract
Since antiquity, visual theorists have variously proposed that perception (usually vision) results from
unconscious inference. This paper reviews historical and recent theories of unconscious inferences, in order to
make explicit their commitments to inferential cognitive processes. In particular, it asks whether the
comparison of perception with inference has been intended metaphorically or literally. It then focuses on the
literal theories, and assesses their resources for responding to three problems that arise when visual perception
is explained as resulting from unconscious inference: the cognitive machinery problem, the sophisticated
content problem, and the phenomenal problem.
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                               Perception as Unconscious Inference*
                                          Gary Hatfield
                                    University of Pennsylvania
               Consider for a moment the spatial and chromatic dimensions of your visual
          experience.  Suppose that as you gaze about the room you see a table, some
          books, and papers.  Ignore for now the fact that you immediately recognize
          these objects to be a table with books and papers on it.  Concentrate on how
          the table looks to you: its top spreads out in front of you, stopping at edges
          beyond which lies unfilled space, leading to more or less distant chairs,
          shelves, or expanses of floor.  The books and paper on the table top create
          shaped visual boundaries between areas of different color, within which there
          may be further variation of color or visual texture.  Propelled by a slight
          breeze, a sheet of paper slides across the table, and you experience its
          smooth motion before it floats out of sight.
               The aspects of visual perception to which I’ve drawn your attention are
          objects of study in contemporary perceptual psychology, which considers the
          perception of size, shape, distance, motion, and color.  These phenomenal
          aspects of vision are sometimes contrasted with other, more typically
          cognitive aspects of perception, including our recognition that the objects in
          front of us include the table, books, and paper, our seeing that the table is
          old and well crafted, and our identifying the sheets of paper as the draft of
          an article in progress.  All of these elements of our visual experience,
          whether characterized here as phenomenal or cognitive,1 seem to arise
          _________________________
          *Forthcoming in _P_e_r_c_e_p_t_i_o_n _a_n_d _t_h_e _P_h_y_s_i_c_a_l _W_o_r_l_d, ed. Dieter Heyer and
          Rainer Mausfeld (Oxford University Press).  An earlier version was presented
          to the Perception and Evolution group at the Center for Interdisciplinary
          Research in Bielefeld, June, 1997.  The author thanks Jacob Beck and Allison
          Crapo for helpful comments on later drafts.
          1.  In using "phenomenal" and "cognitive" as contrastive qualifiers of
          "perception" and related terms, I do not mean to imply that our recognition
          of the table as a table is not a part of our visual experience, or is not as
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          effortlessly as we direct our gaze here and there.  Yet we know that the
          cognitive aspects must depend on previously attained knowledge.  We are not
          born recognizing books and tables, but we learn to categorize these artifacts
          and to determine at a glance that a table is an old one of good quality.  What
          about the phenomenal aspects?
               A persistent theme in the history of visual theory has been that the
          phenomenal aspects of visual perception are produced by inferences or
          judgments, which are unnoticed or unconscious.  The persistence of this theme
          is interesting because, unlike our capacity to recognize a book or to identify
          something as the draft we have been working on, simply having a phenomenal
          experience of surfaces arranged in space and varying in color does not
          obviously require prior knowledge (even though describing such experience
          does).  Nor does such experience seem on the face of it to be the product of
          reasoning or inference, such as we might employ in reasoning from the fact
          that our friend’s books are lying open on the table to the conclusion that she
          is about.  Nonetheless, from ancient times theorists have accounted for visual
          _________________________
          phenomenally immediate as the experience of the shape or color of the table.
          I need contrastive terms that signal the seemingly noncognitive aspect of
          shape or color perception (here distinguished from shape or color
          recognition, classification, and identification), as opposed to decidedly
          cognitive achievements such as object recognition or identification.  For a
          statement of the distinction between perceptual and cognitive aspects of
          vision, see Rock 1975, chap. 1 (especially p. 24).  For a statement of the
          division from a computational and neurophysiological perspective, see Arbib
          and Hanson 1987 (especially pp. 4-5).  For a philosophical statement of the
          contrast, see Dretske 1995 (especially pp. 332-5).  The present contrast
          concerns aspects of perceptual experience itself, and does not describe the
          processes that produce these aspects, which may themselves be cognitive or
          noncognitive.  In this chapter I focus on cognitive theories of the
          processes that produce the phenomenal aspects of experience, though I will
          mention noncognitive theories as well.  I am not concerned with
          epistemological aspects of the theories; on epistemological aspects of
          inferential theories, see Schwartz 1994, pp. 104-110.  Finally, other
          characterizations of the objects of study in contemporary visual perceptual
          psychology can be substituted for the traditional list given above (size,
          shape, etc.), including: the spatial and chromatic layout and changes within
          it, or the spatial and chromatic structure of surfaces and its changes.
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          perception of the size, shape, distance, motion, and (sometimes) color of
          objects in terms of judgment and inference.
               Hermann Helmholtz (1867/1910) provided the paradigm modern statement of
          the theory that visual perception is mediated by unconscious inferences.  His
          name is frequently invoked by recent advocates of the theory (Barlow 1990;
          Gregory 1997, p. 5; Hochberg 1981; Rock 1983, p. 16; Wandell 1995, pp. 7,
          336).  Helmholtz maintained that perception draws on the same cognitive
          mechanisms as do ordinary reasoning and scientific inference (1910, 3:28-29),
          and some theorists make similar comparisons (Barlow 1974; Gregory 1997, pp.
          9-13).  Others in the twentieth century have argued that perception is not
          literally inferential but is "like inference" or "ratiomorphic" (Brunswik
          1956, pp. 141-6), while still others postulate special-purpose inferential
          mechanisms in perception, isolated from ordinary reasoning and knowledge
          (Gregory 1974, pp. 205, 210; Nakamura, He & Shimojo 1995, p. 2; Rock 1983,
          chap. 11).
               In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious
          inference.  Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally,
          not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach.  I examine three
          problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences
          is taken seriously.  Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be
          available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the
          inferences in question.  The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of
          inferences are supposed to explain the phenomenal aspects of visual
          experience, the looks of things.  Finally, in comparing past and recent
          responses to these problems, I provide an assessment of the current prospects
          for inferential theories.
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                         Unconscious Inferences in Theories of Perception
               The idea that unnoticed judgments underlie perception has been in the
          literature of visual science at least since the _O_p_t_i_c_s of Ptolemy (ca. 160;
          see Ptolemy 1989, 1996).  In the past millennium, Alhazen (ca. 1030; 1989),
          Helmholtz (1867/1910), and Rock (1983) have offered explicit versions of the
          theory that perception results from unconscious inferences, in the form of
          (respectively) syllogisms, inductive inferences, and deductions in predicate
          logic.  I will sometimes apply the term "unconscious inference" to all such
          theories, despite the fact that this technical term was introduced by
          Helmholtz (in a German equivalent), and despite variations in theorists’
          characterizations of such inferences, which are noted as needed.  To give some
          sense of the range of theories, I begin by briefly examining two areas: size
          and distance perception, and color constancy.
          Perception of Size at a Distance
               Prior to the development of new conceptions of optical information by
          Gibson (1966) and their extension by Marr (1982), theories of the perception
          of size relied on a common analysis of the stimulus for vision.  One element
          of this analysis was contributed by Euclid (4th century B.C./1945), who
          equated apparent size with the visual angle subtended at the eye.  Five
          centuries later, Ptolemy argued that the perception of an object’s size
          depends on both visual angle and perception or knowledge of the object’s
          distance (1989/1996, II.56).  Surviving versions of his work illustrate the
          problem as in Figure 1.  The eye at E sees objects AB and GD under the same
          visual angle.  If size were determined by visual angle alone, the two objects
          would appear to have the same size.  But, Ptolemy says, when the difference in
          distance is detectable, such objects do not appear to be of the same size, but
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          are seen with their real sizes (if our apprehension of the distance is
          accurate).  Ptolemy was an extramission theorist who held that the crystalline
          humor (now known as the lens) is the sensitive element in the eye; he argued
          that the eye sends something out into the air, which allows the eye to feel
          the length of visual rays such as EA or EG (Ptolemy 1989/1996, II.26).
          Leaving aside the direct apprehension of distance, his position on the
          relation between visual angle and distance in size perception was accepted by
          subsequent authors, whether extramissionists or intromissionists, and whether
          they believed the crystalline or the retina is the sensitive element.  Indeed,
          the geometrical analysis of the perception of size-at-a-distance was
          unaffected by Kepler’s discovery that the lens causes inverted images to be
          formed on the retinas (see Hatfield & Epstein 1979).
               Ptolemy made only brief allusion to the judgments he posited for
          combining visual angle and distance in size perception.  Nearly a millennium
          later, Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham) developed an extended analysis of such
          judgments (ca. 1030; Alhazen 1989).  According to Alhazen, the sense of sight
          perceives only light and color through "pure sensation" (1989, II.3.25).
          Alhazen was an intromission theorist, who held that the eye receives and
          transmits into the brain a cross-section of the visual pyramid, which
          constitutes a two-dimensional, point-for-point ordered record of the field of
          view (1989, I.6.22-32).  In receiving this cross-section, the sense of sight
          also registers the direction from which the light and color comes (1989,
          II.3.97), and so has available the visual angle subtended by an object.  The
          faculty of judgment then combines visual angle and distance information,
          through an "inference and judgment" that has become habitual, rapid, and
          unnoticed, to yield a perception of the size of an object that takes distance
          into account (1989, II.3.145-8).
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               Although the Euclidean equation of apparent size with visual angle was
          sometimes rehearsed in subsequent literature (e.g., Chambers 1738, vol. 1,
          "Apparent magnitude"; Smith 1738, 1:31-2), Alhazen’s view that size perception
          depends on rapid, unnoticed judgments that combine perceived distance with
          visual angle became standard doctrine.  The judgmental account of size
          perception was repeated in diverse works, including those of Descartes
          (1637/1984-85, pt. 6), Rohault (1735, 1:254), Porterfield (1759, 2:377-80), Le
          Cat (1767, 2:441-84, especially 471-84), and Gehler (1787-96, 2:537-42).
          Berkeley (1709) rejected the judgmental account, arguing that the perceptual
          processes leading to size and distance perception are mediated by association,
          not by judgment or inference.  Helmholtz combined aspects of the judgmental
          and associative accounts by proposing that size perception results from
          unconscious inference while giving an associative analysis of the process of
          inference itself (1867/1910, 3:24, 236-7, 242, 434, 439).  More recently,
          neo-Helmholtzians have used the language of inference without association
          (Gregory 1997, Rock 1983), and so in fact are in the tradition of Ptolemy and
          Alhazen.  Others have developed a subjectivist probabilistic analysis of
          perceptual inference (Bennett, Hoffman & Prakash 1989).
          Color Constancy
               The tendency of observers to perceive objects as having a constant size
          at various distances despite variations in the visual angle they subtend at
          the eye was dubbed "size constancy" in the twentieth century.  A similar
          constancy occurs in the case of color.  We typically see objects as having the
          same color (e.g., as being the same shade of blue) under varying conditions of
          illumination (e.g., in sunlight and under artificial lighting).  There is,
          within limits, constancy of perceived color under variations in the intensity
          and color of the ambient light.
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               Alhazen produced an early description of color constancy.  He observed
          that light reflected by an object is modified by the color of the object.  As
          he put it, the quality of the light and of the object are "mingled" in the
          light that reaches the eye.  Through a cognitive act, the perceiver is able to
          separate light and color: "from perceiving the variations of lights falling
          upon visible objects, and from perceiving that objects are sometimes luminous
          and sometimes not, the faculty of judgement perceives that the colours in
          these objects are not the same as the lights that supervene upon them.  Then,
          as this notion is repeated, it is established in the soul, as a universal,
          that colours in coloured objects are not the same as their lights" (1989,
          II.3.48).  Alhazen indicated that through experience the faculty of judgment
          learns the characteristics of various forms of illumination (1989, II.3.50).
          He presumably held that it then is able to separate the color of the object
          from the quality of the illumination.
               Unlike size and shape constancy, color constancy did not become standard
          fare in the early modern literature and was prominently discussed starting
          only in the nineteenth century.2  Twentieth-century theorists have been
          fascinated by color constancy and achromatic brightness constancy, and some
          hold that the fundamental task of color perception is to extract information
          about the reflectance properties of objects from the light reaching the eyes.
          Specifically, many investigators formulate the task of the visual system in
          color constancy as that of recovering the spectral reflectance distribution of
          surfaces.  A spectral reflectance distribution describes the percentage of
          ambient light of differing wavelengths reflected by a surface.  It thus gives
          _________________________
          2.  Phenomenal color constancy was mentioned by Thomas Young (1807, 1:456),
          using the example of white paper under varying intensities and colors of
          illumination.  It was brought into prominence by Helmholtz (1867/1910,
          2:110, 243-4) and Ewald Hering (1875, pp. 335-8; 1920, pp. 13-17), who
          discussed the constancy of object colors in addition to white.
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          a precise physical description of the property of objects that gives them
          color: the disposition to absorb and reflect differing amounts of light as a
          function of wavelength.  If we represent this distribution by R, let I stand
          for the spectral composition of the illuminant and L for that of the light
          reaching the eyes, then L = I*R.  The problem for the visual system is to
          disambiguate I and R, which requires additional information or background
          assumptions.
               Maloney and Wandell formulate the problem of color constancy as that of
          "estimating the surface reflectance functions of objects in a scene with
          incomplete knowledge of the spectral power distribution of the ambient light"
          (1986, p. 29).  They show that approximate color constancy is possible if the
          visual system uses the fact that many natural surfaces can be modeled as
          linear combinations of a small number of "basis functions" (spectral
          reflectance functions), and if the range of ambient light is also describable
          as a linear combination of a small number of basis functions.  That is, they
          suggest that the visual system makes limiting assumptions about the
          composition of natural illuminants and the shapes of surface reflection
          functions, which allow it to make nearly accurate estimates of distal surface
          reflectance distributions on the basis of the incoming light.  On this view,
          the goal of color constancy is to generate a physical description of the
          spectrophotometric properties of distal surfaces.  In a recent theoretical
          survey of linear models and other computational approaches to color constancy,
          Hurlbert (1998) endorsed this conception of the aim of color constancy,
          arguing that since "spectral reflectance is an invariant property of
          surfaces," it is therefore "plausible, if not perfectly logical, to assume
          that color constancy results from the attempt to recover spectral reflectance
          in the more general pursuit of object recognition" (1998, p. 283).
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                           Problems for Unconscious Inference Theories
               In order to count as a psychological or perceptual theory, a description
          of visual perception as involving unconscious inferences must do more than
          simply compare perceptual processes to the making of inferences.  It must do
          such things as the following: describe the premises of such inferences, say
          how the premises come to be instantiated, account for the process of inference
          from premises to conclusions, describe the conclusions, and say how arrival at
          the conclusion constitutes or explains perception.
               My own reflections on theories of unconscious perceptual inference
          indicate that they face (at least) three challenging problems.  First, since
          they attribute unconscious inferences to the perceptual system, they must
          account for the cognitive resources needed to carry them out.  Are the
          unconscious inferences posited to explain size perception and color constancy
          carried out by the same cognitive mechanisms that account for conscious and
          deliberate inferences, or does the visual system have its own inferential
          machinery?  In either case, what is the structure of the posited mechanisms?
          This is the _c_o_g_n_i_t_i_v_e _m_a_c_h_i_n_e_r_y _p_r_o_b_l_e_m.  Second, how shall we describe the
          content of the premises and conclusions?  For instance, in size perception it
          might be that the premises include values for visual angle and perceived
          distance, along with a representation of the algorithm relating the two.  Or
          in color constancy, the conclusion might describe a spectral reflectance
          distribution.  But shall we literally attribute concepts of visual angle and
          wavelength to the visual system?  This is the _s_o_p_h_i_s_t_i_c_a_t_e_d _c_o_n_t_e_n_t _p_r_o_b_l_e_m.
          Third, to be fully explanatory, unconscious inference theories of perception
          must explain how the conclusion of an inference about size and distance leads
          to the experience of an object as having a certain size and being at a certain
          distance, or how a conclusion about a spectral reflectance distribution yields
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          the experience of a specific hue.  In other words, the theories need to
          explain how the conclusion to an inference, perhaps conceived linguistically,
          can be or can cause visual experience, with its imagistic quality.3  This is
          the _p_h_e_n_o_m_e_n_a_l _e_x_p_e_r_i_e_n_c_e _p_r_o_b_l_e_m.
          Cognitive Machinery
               Inferential theories typically posit an early sensory representation that
          differs from ordinary perception in its portrayal of various properties of
          objects.  This original sensory representation, or sensation, might represent
          the shape of an object as a two-dimensional projection, so that a circle
          tilted away from the observer would be represented as an ellipse.  Judgment or
          inference would then be called upon to mediate the change in representation
          from sensation to perception--in this case, to the perception of the true
          (circular) shape.  The means for carrying out such inferences need to be
          specified, and the long history of inferential theories has seen various
          conceptions of the psychological processes thought to be involved.4
          _________________________
          3.  Dennett (1991, chap. 12) would contest this way of posing the third
          problem, since he denies the reality of imagistic phenomenal experience; but
          a theorist who subscribed to his views would still be faced with the problem
          of explaining how an inferential conclusion can _s_e_e_m to be the experience of
          a specific hue, or whatever.
          4.  My formulation of the cognitive machinery problem is distinct from _a
          _p_r_i_o_r_i arguments that conclude, on conceptual grounds, that unconscious
          inference theories must be false, as when Ludwig (1996) argues that the very
          concept of an unconscious inference is incoherent.  Among Ludwig’s other
          arguments, only one overlaps with my three problems.  He requires (1996, pp.
          398-39) that the concepts expressed in perceptual inferences be attributed
          to perceivers (my sophisticated content problem), and argues that the visual
          system could not have them (on conceptual grounds), and that children and
          animals do not have them (a common sense empirical argument).  None of my
          three problems are purely conceptual or _a _p_r_i_o_r_i; the first two concern the
          empirical plausibility of needed explanatory apparatus, and the third
          concerns the explanatory adequacy of theories as developed thus far.  The
          question of the attribution of subpersonal cognitive states has generated
          discussion (see Davies 1995).  On this score I agree with Fodor (1975, pp.
          52-53).  Although there are various moral, legal, and cultural reasons for
          wanting, in many contexts, to use the language of "inference" and "belief"
          to describe only acts of (whole) persons, for the purposes of psychological
          theory there are not adequate grounds _a _p_r_i_o_r_i to preclude ascriptions of
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               Although Ptolemy assigned a role to judgment in the apprehension of size,
          he provided little analysis of such judgments, simply referring them to a
          "governing faculty" or "discerning power" (1989/1996, II.22-23, 76).  Alhazen,
          by contrast, carefully analyzed the role of judgment in perception (1989,
          II.3.1-42).  He contended that any perceptual act beyond the passive
          apprehension of light and color requires judgment or inference.  Such acts
          include recognition of color categories (as opposed to mere sensations of
          color), perception of similarity or dissimilarity between objects, and
          perception of distance.  Further, the judgments or inferences in question
          typically require comparison with previous instances (in the case of acts of
          recognition), or depend on previous learning (as when the known size of an
          object is used together with visual angle to judge distance).  But since on
          his view the senses themselves do not judge, compare, or learn from previous
          instances (1989, II.3.17-25), the faculty of judgment must enter into
          perception.
               Judgmental theories are faced with the fact that if perception relies on
          judgments, the judgments go unnoticed.  In providing an explanation of this
          fact, Alhazen gave his fullest description of the judgments themselves.  He
          began by contrasting the unnoticed judgments of perception with the visual
          theorist’s careful and deliberate judgment that perception is judgmental
          (1989, II.3.26, 30, 36).  The former judgments are rapid and habitual, the
          latter slow and reflective.  In ordinary acts of perceiving we do not usually
          undertake the slow and reflective act of determining that, say, the perception
          of size requires a judgment.  We therefore remain unaware that a rapid and
          habitual judgment has occurred.  Alhazen nonetheless argued that unnoticed
          _________________________
          cognitive states to subsystems of persons, including the psychological
          mechanisms underlying vision.  There may of course be theoretical or
          empirical grounds for such a preclusion.
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          perceptual judgments are carried out by the same "faculty of judgment"
          involved in all judgments, including conscious ones.  He further contended
          that perceptual judgments are equivalent to syllogistic inferences (1989,
          II.3.27-42).  This identification of the process of perception with logical
          inference required further explanation, since perception is on the face of it
          not linguistic, whereas syllogisms apparently are.
               Alhazen explained away this apparent dissimilarity between perception and
          inference by arguing that ordinary syllogistic inferences need not be properly
          linguistic, either.  He contended that syllogistic inferences of the sort that
          can be expressed by a verbal syllogism need not be and typically are not
          actually produced in explicit linguistic form.  He compared the rapid
          inferences of perception to cases in which we reach a conclusion rapidly,
          without consciously entertaining any logical steps.  In one of his examples,
          upon hearing someone exclaim "How effective this sword is!" the listener
          immediately understands that the sword is sharp.  She does so on the basis of
          the universal premise "Every effective sword is sharp."  But the conclusion is
          achieved "without the need for words or for repeating and ordering the
          premisses, or the need for repeating and ordering the words" (1989, II.3.28).
          As Alhazen explained, in neither perception nor in the sword example (where
          one premise is given verbally) does the faculty of judgment need to formulate
          an explicit syllogism using words in order for it to carry out an inference.
          Rather, from the moment it understands the content of the particular premise,
          given that it remembers the content of the universal, it immediately
          understands the conclusion (1989, II.3.29).  Alhazen would seem to suggest
          that in both sorts of case the faculty of judgment operates from a non-
          linguistic grasp of the content of premises and conclusions.  Accordingly, he
          could claim that the same judgmental capacity which underlies our rapid
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          understanding of everyday events serves as the cognitive machinery for
          perception.  It carries out its operations by grasping content directly, and
          does not require linguistic form.
               Five centuries later the philosopher and mathematician Ren’e Descartes,
          who wrote in an optical tradition continuous with Alhazen, appealed to
          unnoticed processes of reasoning in explaining size, shape, and distance
          perception.5  In his _O_p_t_i_c_s Descartes explained that the size of objects is
          judged "by the knowledge or opinion we have of their distance, compared with
          the size of the images they imprint on the back of the eye--and not simply by
          the size of these images" (1984-85, 1:172).  In the sixth set of Replies to
          Objections to the _M_e_d_i_t_a_t_i_o_n_s, he explained that these judgments, though rapid
          and habitual, are made "in exactly the same way as those we make now"
          (1641/1984-85, 2:295).  Descartes held that sensation yields an image whose
          elements vary (at least) in size, shape, and color.  As infants, we gain
          habits for judging the size, shape, distance, and color of distant objects on
          the basis of such images.  Apprehension of shapes, size, and color in the
          images, as well as other relevant information (such as eye position), provide
          the content of the minor premises of our perceptual inferences.  The major
          premises are rules such as the one relating size, visual angle, and distance.
          Through repetition the transition from visual angle and distance information
          to the experience of an object’s size becomes habitual and so is no longer
          recognized as being judgmentally based.  Nonetheless, Descartes affirmed that
          both the unnoticed judgments of perception and the reflective judgments of the
          mature thinker are carried out by the same cognitive mechanism, which he
          _________________________
          5.  Descartes also gave a purely psychophysical account of distance
          perception, according to which the brain states that control accommodation
          and convergence directly cause a corresponding idea of distance (Descartes
          1664/1972, p. 94; 1637/1984-85, 1:170; see Hatfield 1992b, p. 357).
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          described as the faculty of intellect.
               The fact that Descartes and Alhazen (and many others) proffered a faculty
          analysis of mind has been seen as an embarrassment.  Such analyses were later
          ridiculed in the manner of Moli‘ere’s famous jest in which a doctor says that
          opium makes people sleepy because it has a dormitive virtue (Moli‘ere
          1682/1965, p. 143).  Such jokes, and the easy dismissal of faculty psychology,
          fail to distinguish two potential aims of faculty theories, only one of which
          is sometimes laughable.  Moli‘ere’s joke plays on the idea that a physician has
          sought to _e_x_p_l_a_i_n how opium puts people to sleep by appealing to its dormitive
          virtue, rather than simply to _d_e_s_c_r_i_b_e its power to do so.  Now it may well be
          that some of those ascribing "faculties" or "powers" to things understood this
          to be an inherently explanatory act, as it may be in some circumstances (see
          Hutchison 1991).  But in other cases talk of powers is descriptive and
          taxonomic, and amounts to a nontrivial parsing of the real capacities of
          things.  In the case of Alhazen’s and Descartes’s appeal to the intellectual
          faculty, Moli‘ere’s joke would apply to them only if they tried to explain how
          the mind reasons by saying it has a faculty of reason.  Instead I see their
          efforts as part of an attempt to analyze the mind into a set of primitive
          capacities that are then used to explain particular abilities.  So, in the
          case of size perception, a seemingly pure sensory ability is explained by
          appealing to an interaction between the capacity for rational inference and
          the passive reception of sensory information.  The mind’s capacity for
          rational inference is invoked to explain how sensations are transformed or
          supplanted to yield perceptions of shape.  The judgmental capacity itself is
          not explained.
               One might expect that since Descartes argued that the same intellectual
          faculty is involved in perception and other reasoning he would hold that
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          perceptual judgments are subject to modification and correction in relation to
          consciously entertained knowledge.  But he (in effect) admitted the opposite.
          In the familiar illusion of the straight stick that appears bent when half
          submerged in water, Descartes held that the appearance results from unnoticed
          judgments (habits of judging visual position) learned in childhood
          (1641/1984-85, 2:295-6).  When an adult suffers the illusion, the intellect
          operates by habit, without forming a new judgment for the occasion.  At the
          same time, the intellect is able, by reflecting on its tactual experience, to
          know that the stick is really straight.  Descartes wrote with full
          appreciation of the fact that this judgment does not affect the appearance of
          the stick.  In general, the unnoticed judgments he posited to explain
          perception were not open to conscious revision.  Later, Immanuel Kant drew
          explicit attention to the fact that the moon illusion is impervious to
          knowledge, presumably because the judgments that underlie it are habitual and
          unnoticed and so not open to scrutiny or correction (Kant 1787/1998, pp. 384,
          386; see Hatfield 1990, pp. 105-6).
               Berkeley introduced a new position into the psychology of visual
          perception when he sought to replace the accepted judgmental account of the
          processes underlying perception with an associational account.  Motivated in
          part by a desire to support his immaterialist metaphysics (Atherton 1990,
          chap. 12), Berkeley rethought visual theory from the ground up, focusing on
          the psychology of vision.  He began from a point that was shared by
          intromission theorists, that distance is not "immediately sensed" (as Ptolemy,
          an extramissionist, had held), but must be perceived via other cues or sources
          of information, whether contained in the optical pattern or received
          collaterally (as in feelings from the ocular musculature).  In Berkeley’s
          terms, since distance is not directly perceived, it must be perceived "by
                                              - 16 -
          means of some other idea" (1709, sec. 11).  From there, he mounted a frontal
          assault on the widely shared theory that distance is perceived via "lines and
          angles," as when distance is allegedly perceived by reasoning using the
          angle-side-angle relation of a triangle and the perceived convergence of the
          eyes, or using the known size of the object together with perceived visual
          angle.  Berkeley’s argument unfolded in two steps.  First, he maintained that
          "no idea which is not itself perceived can be the means for perceiving any
          other idea" (1709, sec. 10).  Second, he denied that we are ever aware of
          "lines and angles" in visual perception: "In vain shall all the mathematicians
          in the world tell me that I perceive certain lines and angles which introduce
          into my mind the various ideas of distance so long as I myself am conscious of
          no such thing" (1709, sec. 12).  He explained the perception of distance by
          means of several cues, including: (1) the interposition of numerous objects
          between the viewer and the target object (1709, sec. 3; 1733, sec. 62), (2)
          faintness of the target (1709, sec. 3; 1733, sec. 62), (3) visible magnitude
          in relation to known size (1733, sec. 62), (4) height in visual field (objects
          further off are typically higher in the field of vision but below the horizon,
          1733, sec. 62), and (5) the muscular sensation accompanying the rotation of
          the eyes during convergence (1709, sec. 16; 1733, sec. 66).
               Counterparts to each of these five cues were in the optical literature.
          Berkeley departed from previous accounts in contending that in none of the
          cases is there a "rational" or "necessary" connection between cue and
          perceived distance.  The various factors listed in (1) to (5) serve, in his
          view, as so many arbitrary visual signs, whose meanings with respect to
          tactually perceived distance must be learned.  For example, for angle-side-
          angle reasoning in distance perception he substituted an acquired association
          between ocular muscle feelings and tactually perceived distance (1709, secs.
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          12-20).  Such associations, or connections of "suggestion," are formed between
          two ideas that regularly co-occur.  They are not the result of a cognitive
          connection judged to exist between the perceived contents of the ideas, but
          arise solely from repeated co-occurrence.  But, Berkeley argued, connections
          made through blind habit are distinct from (content-sensitive) inferences
          (1733, sec. 42).  His process of habitual connection or suggestion is
          equivalent to what became more widely known as the association of ideas.
               Berkeley is the originator of the associationist account of distance
          perception.  He also made famous the position that we "learn to see" objects
          in depth at a distance.  In the 150 years after he wrote, various judgmental
          or associationist accounts of perception were proposed.  Some authors took the
          analysis of perceptual experience into sensational ingredients even further
          than Berkeley, and attempted to show how spatial representations could be
          derived form aspatial or punctiform elementary sensations via association
          (Steinbuch 1811) or via a combination of reasoning and association (Brown
          1824, lecs. 22-24, 28-29).  Others adopted the radical analysis of spatial
          perception into aspatial elements, but posited innate laws of sensibility
          (distinct from judgment and inference) to govern the construction of spatial
          representations (Tourtual 1827).  In each case, the authors supposed that each
          nerve fiber in the optic nerve produces a single sensation, varying only in
          quality and intensity.  Meanwhile, the textbooks repeated the older account
          that size perception starts from an innately given two-dimensional
          representation and proceeds via unnoticed judgments (see Hatfield 1990, chap.
          4).
               In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Helmholtz formulated the
          classical statement of the theory that spatial perception results from
          unconscious inferences.  The primary statement of the theory occurred in
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          section 26 of his _H_a_n_d_b_u_c_h _d_e_r _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_s_c_h_e_n _O_p_t_i_k (1867/1910).  Helmholtz
          combined the associative and inferential accounts by giving an associational
          account of inference.  He compared the inferences of perception to syllogisms
          in which the major premise has been established inductively.  He adopted the
          radical punctiform analysis of visual sensation.  In his account, stimulation
          of any given retinal nerve fiber initially yields a sensation that varies in
          only three ways: hue, intensity, and "local sign."  A local sign is a
          qualitative marker peculiar to each nerve fiber (Helmholtz 1867/1910, 3:130,
          435-436).  These signs originally carry no spatial meaning, but through
          coordination with bodily motion and sensations of touch (which are assumed to
          have spatial meaning) the observer acquires the ability (unconsciously) to
          localize sensations on the basis of local signs.  For example, the observer
          might acquire a universal premise that light hitting the right side of the
          retina comes from the left (1867/1910, 3:24).  Helmholtz described the process
          of learning the spatial meaning of local signs in terms of active testing, and
          compared it to hypothesis testing in science.  But in both cases he conceived
          the psychological processes that yield inductive conclusions from testing as
          associative.  In the case of learning the meaning of local signs via touch,
          Helmholtz maintained that "while in these cases no actual conscious inference
          is present, yet the essential and original office of an inference has been
          performed" (1867/1910, 3:24).6  The inference is achieved "simply, of course,
          by the unconscious processes of the association of ideas going on in the dark
          _________________________
          6.  The translations are mine.  The third German edition of 1910 reprinted
          the text of the first edition of 1867 and added a great deal of useful
          apparatus and commentary by the editors, and it was translated by J. P. C.
          Southall as Helmholtz 1924-25.  Southall conveniently provided the
          corresponding page numbers for the third German edition at the top of each
          page, which makes it easy to coordinate my citations of the German with his
          translation.  Southall’s translation, while useful for many purposes, is
          misleading on numerous occasions, especially concerning Helmholtz’s
          psychological theory.
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          background of our memory" (1867/1910, 3:24).  In this way, Helmholtz
          assimilated inference to association.7
               The most explicit recent analysis of unconscious inferences in perception
          is due to Irvin Rock (1983).  Rock identified four sorts of cognitive
          operations at work in perception: (1) unconscious description, in the case of
          form perception (1983, chap. 3); (2) problem solving and inference to the best
          explanation, in the case of stimulus ambiguity or stimulus features that would
          yield unexplained coincidences if interpreted literally (1983, chaps. 4-7);
          (3) relational determination of percepts, such as those involved in perceiving
          lightness and relational motion through the interpretation of relational
          stimulus information in accordance with certain assumptions (1983, chap. 8);
          and (4) deductive inference from a universal major premise and an
          unconsciously given minor premise, used to explain the constancies (1983,
          chap. 9).  All four operations posit unnoticed acts of cognition.  The first
          operation is not inferential, since it merely involves description; but it
          illustrates Rock’s view that the cognitive operations of perception are based
          upon internal descriptions in an (unknown) language of thought (1983, p. 99).
          Rock’s formulations are cautious: he says perception is "like" problem-solving
          and deductive inference (1983, pp. 1, 100, 239, 272, 341).  But his account is
          not merely ratiomorphic.  In the end, he held that perception does involve
          unconscious reasoning, including both inductive formation of rules (1983, pp.
          310-11) and deductive inference from rules.  The cognitive machinery for such
          inferences operates in a linguistic medium and follows the rules of predicate
          _________________________
          7.  Helmholtz (1910, 3:23) cited John Stuart Mill in support of his
          associationist account of inductive inference, and in fact in his _L_o_g_i_c of
          1843 Mill endorsed an associational account; but in the 1851 edition he
          qualified this endorsement (Mill 1974, p. 664). For additional problems with
          Helmholtz’s associative account of inference, see Hatfield 1990, pp. 204-
          208.
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          logic (1983, pp. 99, 272-3).  The rules governing perceptual inference may be
          either learned or innate--Rock rejected Helmholtz’s emphasis on learning
          (1983, pp. 312-316)
               Rock’s cautious formulations reflect the fact that he recognized a sharp
          divide between the processes of perception and the processes that underlie
          conscious describing, problem solving, rule-based calculations, and deductive
          inference.  Some separation of this kind is demanded by the fact known to
          Descartes, Kant, and others: that the perceptual process often is impervious
          to knowledge, as when visual illusions persist despite being detected.  It is
          a seeming paradox for cognitive accounts of perceptual processing that
          perception is isolated from and inflexible in the face of other cognitive
          factors, such as the conscious knowledge that the lines are the same length in
          the Mueller-Lyer illusion (Rock 1983, pp. 336-7).  Rock responded by proposing
          a strict separation between ordinary cognition and the cognitive processes
          underlying perception.  He separated the knowledge relevant to perception into
          two divisions: immediate stimulus based information, and unconscious
          descriptions, concepts, and rules (1983, p. 302).  The unconscious processes
          typically take into account only such information about a particular stimulus
          as is available in current stimulation; he called this the condition of
          "stimulus support" (1983, p. 303).  Achromatic color illusions, such as the
          Gelb effect--in which a black circle appears white if it alone is illuminated
          by a spotlight in an otherwise dark room--disappear when a white contrast
          paper is moved into the light, but reappear as soon as the stimulus support
          provided by the white paper is removed.  Apparently the perceptual system is
          caught up in the moment!  Rock further postulated that the concepts and rules
          used in the unconscious cognitive operations of perception are isolated from
          central cognitive processes of description, categorization, and hypothesis
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          formation (1983, pp. 306, 310, 313, 315).  He in effect posited a special-
          purpose domain of concepts, rules, and reasoning to support the processes of
          perception.
               Rock supported his comparisons of perception to problem solving and
          inference with an extensive program of empirical research.  Others, pursuing
          general theories of mind in the fields of artificial intelligence and
          cognitive science, have used perception as an example of a mental process that
          fits their general model.  Such theoreticians have of necessity been explicit
          about the cognitive machinery.  They have sought to provide an explanation of
          the cognitive capacities that were used as explanatory primitives by earlier
          theorists.
               Fodor (1975) was an early and articulate advocate of the theory that the
          mind is importantly similar to a general purpose digital computer and that its
          cognitive operations are carried out in an internal language of thought.  He
          compared the language of thought to the machine language in a computer (1975,
          pp. 65-68).  Just as a computer is "built to use" its machine language, and so
          need not acquire it, the brain comes with its own built in language.  This
          language then serves as the medium in which perceptual hypotheses are framed
          and tested.  Although I agree with Crane (1992, p. 148) that it remains an
          open question whether one absolutely must posit an internal language in order
          to account for the inferential abilities of humans and other cognitive agents,
          Fodor’s posit of a language of thought does provide a powerful model for
          unconscious inferences.  The inferential machinery of perception is a full-
          scale language, with syntactically based inference rules for drawing
          conclusions from premises.
               Fodor (1983) took into account the same fact that we have found in Rock
          (1983), that perceptual inferences are relatively insulated from the
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          consciously available knowledge of the perceiver.  Largely in response to this
          fact, Fodor adopted the position that perceptual processes take place in
          cognitively insulated modules.  Although Fodor (1983) did not describe precise
          structures for his innate machine language, he gave no reason to suppose that
          the language-of-thought of the various perceptual modules is the same as that
          of other cognitive modules.  Theory would dictate that the output of such
          modules must be usable by subsequent processes.  But there is no necessity for
          the postulated linguistic medium that underlies the processes of shape
          perception to have precise analogues of the shape vocabulary of the central
          cognitive processes of shape identification.  The modularity thesis and its
          counterpart in Rock (1983) undermine the assumption that perceptual inferences
          are one with ordinary thought.
               Acceptance of the modularity thesis forsakes the (perhaps implausible)
          parsimony of traditional inferential accounts.  From Alhazen (ca. 1030/1989)
          to Helmholtz (1867/1910), theorists had posited a unity between the mechanisms
          underlying perception and those underlying thought more generally.  The notion
          of cognitively isolated (Rock 1983) or insulated (Fodor 1983) modules replaces
          this simple unity with distinct cognitive mechanisms and processes for the
          postulated inferences of perception and the inferences of conscious thought.
          This separation of processes places a new burden on contemporary inferential
          theories, for now they must account for the cognitive resources employed in
          perception independently of the general cognitive resources of perceivers.
          Sophisticated Content
               Theorists who posit that perception occurs via inferences from sensory
          premises to perceptual conclusion take on a commitment to the psychological
          reality of the premises and conclusions.  This in turn requires a commitment
          that the visual system, governing agency, faculty of judgment, or the
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          intellect has the resources to think the premises and conclusions.  If
          perceptual processes are indeed unnoticed judgments, then the cognitive
          faculty that carries them out must be able to comprehend the content of such
          judgments.  In more modern terms, if unconscious processes are posited that
          involve descriptions, then the perceptual system or its auxiliary must have
          the conceptual resources to express the content found in the descriptions.8
               Early theorists recognized the need for supplying conceptual resources to
          the visual system by bringing the faculty of judgment or the intellect into
          perception.  Thus, when Alhazen argued that one and the same intellectual
          faculty operates in everyday cognition and in the unnoticed judgments of
          perception, he presumably assumed that the faculty has the same conceptual
          resources available in both cases.  Alhazen held that over the course of a
          lifetime, we learn to recognize instantaneously all of the visible properties
          of things, without being aware of the acts of recognition or judgment involved
          (II.3.42).  He thus believed that the perceiver’s full range of concepts is
          available for perception.
               Descartes also maintained that sensory perception relies on habitual
          judgments of the intellect.  Because he attributed innate ideas to the
          _________________________
          8.  As is explained at the end of this section, I am assuming that genuine
          inferences are couched in representations that express their content in such
          a way that it is available to the subsystem performing the inference.
          Systems that merely transform and transmit information without sensitivity
          to its content, such as a computer keyboard system (which transforms
          physical pressure into internal symbols, and may do so conditionally, as
          with the "shift" key), do not count as performing inferences.  By contrast,
          in a conceptual encoding, having a concept requires its being connected to
          other concepts (Crane 1992, pp. 142-149; Smith 1995).  Philosophers have of
          course been interested in the question of how there could be systems in
          which conceptual content is expressed (e.g., Dretske 1988).  Further, it has
          been thought that inferential operations might take place solely in virtue
          of the syntax of internal inscriptions; but even in such cases, the
          syntactic entities will have to be related to other syntactic entities in
          sufficiently complex ways to treat some of them as predicates corresponding
          to concepts (Fodor 1975, chap. 2).
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          perceiver, one would expect him also to believe that the intellect has all its
          concepts available for perceptual inference.  Nonetheless, he recognized a _d_e
          _f_a_c_t_o limitation on the conceptual vocabulary expressed in unnoticed
          perceptual judgments.  He suggested that we are unable to revise our habitual
          judgment, formed in childhood, that objects contain something "wholly
          resembling" the color we experience (1644/1984-85, I.70-72).  Because the
          childhood judgments have become frozen as unnoticed habits, we are unable to
          use the concepts of the true physics, discovered through mature intellectual
          reflection, to revise our early judgments about resemblance.  As befits the
          infantile formation of unnoticed perceptual judgments, their conceptual
          content is restricted by comparison with the sophisticated concepts of the
          metaphysician and natural philosopher.
               By contrast, Berkeley’s associationist account avoided any need for the
          unnoticed processes of perception to use sophisticated conceptual content,
          because the processes he described make no use of conceptualized content of
          any sort.  In his account of size perception, visual ideas corresponding to
          visual angle give rise to perceptions of size as a result of acquired
          associations among visible magnitudes (visual angle), visual cues for
          distance, and tactual perceptions of distance.  The elements to be associated
          are related to one another as arbitrary signs.  In his view, there is no
          intelligible connection between cues such as ocular muscle feelings and
          tactual distance.  The mind does not perceive distance because it understands
          that certain muscle feelings result from accommodations of the lens that vary
          with distance; rather, the perceiver is simply trained by experience to
          associate specific muscle feelings with specific tactual distances.
               Berkeley contrasted his account with Descartes’s, in which a perceiver
          might make use of intelligible relations among ideas, as in angle-side-angle
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          reasoning about distance.9  He challenged the proposal that perceivers make
          use of geometrical lines and angles in everyday perception by asserting that
          most people do not possess the requisite notions.  He denied that lines and
          angles are "ever thought of by those unskillful in optics" (1709, sec. 12).
          Ordinary perceivers therefore cannot bring the technical concepts of optics to
          bear in unconscious or unnoticed descriptions of the objects vision.  He
          further argued that since perceivers (whether geometrically sophisticated or
          not) are not conscious of reasoning from lines and angles, they do not reason
          from them.  On the face of it this argument seems weak, for Berkeley himself
          posited unnoticed processes of suggestion (or association).  But he might
          argue that it is plausible for at least some noncognitive habits to remain
          unnoticed throughout both their formation and operation, while sophisticated
          geometrical inferences could not.  Some noncognitive motor habits are surely
          formed without our even knowing we have them (e.g., habits of gait).  By
          contrast, we are all familiar with the ways in which we at first have to pay
          attention to new cognitive tasks, before they become habitual.  But the
          adherents of unconscious inference posit inferential acts of which we seem
          never to have been aware.  Hence Berkeley might be proposing that the sort of
          sophisticated mathematical reasoning ascribed by the "natural geometry"
          argument is not the sort of thing that could become habitual if it had not
          first been part of a conscious reasoning process.  By contrast, his unnoticed
          processes are habits formed through blind acts of association, which serve to
          connect ideas to one another simply as a result of their temporal co-
          occurrence.
          _________________________
          9.  Although Descartes provided a purely psychophysical (and so
          noncognitive) account of distance perception via convergence, in some cases
          he attributed unnoticed geometrical reasoning to the perceiver, as in the
          perception of distance from known size and visual angle (see Hatfield 1992b,
          p. 357).
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               Early nineteenth century theorists, such as Steinbuch (1811) and Tourtual
          (1827), developed an extensive analysis of visual perception which described
          its initial content as phenomenal and unconceptualized.  They described the
          sensational elements of visual perception as unspatialized punctiform
          sensations varying in hue and intensity, and then gave a detailed account of
          how psychological operations create spatial representations from this
          nonspatial sensory core (see Hatfield 1990, chap. 4).  Both theorists posited
          noncognitive operations, distinct from the judgment and intellect, that order
          sensations by quality and intensity.  Steinbuch posited learned associations
          among muscle sensations, built up slowly, starting _i_n _u_t_e_r_o, to create a
          mapping from retinal fibers to two-dimensional representation (allegedly) on
          the basis solely of phenomenal similarity and temporal contiguity.10  Tourtual
          posited innate laws of sensibility, also operating on the qualitative
          character of elemental sensations.  In each case, there was no question of
          sophisticated conceptual content doing the ordering, since the operations were
          conceived as preconceptual.
               We have seen that Helmholtz also posited aspatial elemental sensations,
          but that he characterized the transformative processes as at once
          associational and inferential.  His contention that unconscious inferences
          could be explained psychologically as resulting from associational processes
          meant that his analysis of the psychology of perception could focus on the
          phenomenal character of sensations, since association operates on phenomenally
          characterized sensations.  His description of the resultant perceptual images
          as the conclusions of inferences introduced a certain tension into his
          _________________________
          10.  Although Alhazen (1989, II.l3.22) treated similarity as something to be
          detected intellectually, the associationist tradition in the nineteenth
          century posited laws as operating blindly over one-dimensional similarities
          (as among sensations within a single modality, or along a single dimension
          within a modality, such as hue).
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          account, because of the apparent difference between perceptual images and the
          linguistic conclusions of logical inferences.  But Helmholtz held that there
          is "only a superficial difference between the inferences of logicians and
          those inductive inferences whose results we recognize in the intuitions of the
          outer world we attain through our sensations."  (By "intuition" he means a
          perceptual image.)  He continued:  "The chief difference is that the former
          are capable of expression in words, while the latter are not, because instead
          of words they deal only with sensations and memory images of sensations"
          (1896, 1:358; 1995, p. 198).  So the content of perceptual premises and
          conclusions are sensations and images.11  What about the major premises, the
          universal rules for localizing sensations in space?  These are associations
          among sensations, forged through relations of contiguity and resemblance.
          They operate over the phenomenal properties of sensations, including, for
          vision, punctiform sensations varying in hue, intensity, and local sign, and
          feelings of innervation of the ocular (and bodily) musculature.  Helmholtz’s
          associationist account of unconscious inference allowed him to restrict the
          content and operation of perceptual inferences to the phenomenal properties of
          sensations and phenomenal relations among sensations, operated upon by
          conceptually blind laws of association.  There is no need to attribute
          _________________________
          11.  Helmholtz believed that an image can contain the content of a judgment:
          "it is clearly possible, using the sensible images of memory instead of
          words, to produce the same kind of combination which, when expressed in
          words, would be called a proposition or judgment" (1896, 1:358; 1995, p.
          199).  Indeed, Helmholtz considered concepts of objects to be resolvable
          into a series of images of the objects, comprising both perspectival and
          cross-sectional images (1882-95, 3:545; 1971, p. 507).  As Fodor (1975, pp.
          174-184) has observed, any theory that attempts to equate propositions with
          images faces problems of ambiguity.  For examples, does a picture of a man
          walking on a slope and facing upwards express the content that he is walking
          up, or walking down backwards?  One cannot avoid introducing an active
          mental element of grasping or connecting the "relevant" aspects of an image
          with other images to express a propositional content.  The continuation of
          the passage quoted in this note suggests that Helmholtz was sensitive to
          this point and believed that associative connections would suffice.
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          sophisticated content to Helmholtzian perceptual inferences.
               In the twentieth century, appeal to laws of association operating over
          aspatial sensations characterized by phenomenal qualities has fallen out of
          favor.12  The most developed of today’s inferential accounts posit underlying
          language-like representations to mediate the inferential connections.  As we
          have seen, theorists such as Rock (1983) and Fodor (1983) posit special
          cognitive subsystems for perception.  This allows them to restrict the range
          of concepts attributed to the subsystem.  Rock’s isolated cognitive domain
          requires only a comparatively modest conceptual vocabulary for describing
          sensory aspects of objects, such as form and other spatial characteristics.
          His problem-solving and inference-formation operations work on these
          perceptual features.  A typical Rockian inference might combine information
          about the ego-centric tilt of line with information about head-tilt to yield a
          perception of real world orientation, or combine visual angle and distance
          information to yield a perception of size (Rock 1983, 273-4).  The descriptive
          vocabulary here is impoverished relative to general cognition, focusing as it
          does on spatial properties in ego-centric and environmental frames of
          reference (1983, 331-2).  Fodor’s (1983, pp. 86-97) point about the
          conceptually "shallow" outputs of perceptual modules provides a more general
          framework for attributing special purpose, modest conceptual vocabularies to
          the visual system.
          _________________________
          12.  Connectionism is often regarded as carrying on the associationist
          tradition (Quinlan 1991, pp. 2-3).  Further, some connectionist models
          provide a noncognitive basis for detecting similarities among patterns
          (Quinlan 1991, pp. 49-56).  The patterns are matched via the activation of
          patterns of input nodes, not by unreduced phenomenal qualities of hue and
          intensity.  Still, in cases in which the input nodes are feature detectors,
          these accounts bear an analogy to a dephenomenologized Helmholtzian account,
          with the important exception that they probably are not aptly characterized
          as inferential accounts (on which, more below).
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               Other computational accounts of vision strain the bounds of plausibility
          in ascribing perceptual inferences with sophisticated content.  Difficulties
          arise especially for certain computational models of color constancy.  We have
          seen that Maloney and Wandell describe the task of the visual system in color
          constancy as that of "estimating the surface reflectance functions of objects
          in a scene with incomplete knowledge of the spectral power distribution of the
          ambient light" (1986, p. 29).  If one takes these authors at their word, they
          attribute a rich conceptual vocabulary to the visual system, including
          sophisticated physical concepts such as surface reflective function (spectral
          reflectance distribution).  It seems implausible to attribute such content to
          encapsulated processes of early vision.  The human species came upon these
          physical concepts only late in its development, after the time of Newton.  Yet
          the species developed trichromatic color vision hundreds of thousands of years
          earlier (Goldsmith 1991).  So the mechanisms and processes that yield our
          trichromatic color vision, whether viewed as occurring in a language of
          thought or via nonlinguistic processing mechanisms, could not have had access
          to sophisticated physical concepts.  And if they are encapsulated, as seems
          certain, then these processes still would not have access to such concepts
          (even if the perceiver has "central system" knowledge of physics).
          Consequently, the output of the color system does not conceptually encode such
          notions.
               There is an alternative way of construing the statements of Maloney and
          Wandell (1986), which would make sense of their saying that the visual system
          contains information about spectral reflectance distributions, but which would
          cut against inclusion of their color constancy model in the family of
          "unconscious inference" theories.  The mathematical notion of information,
          developed by Shannon (1948) and others and brought into perceptual theory in
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          the 1950s by Attneave (1954), provides a way of describing the information
          contained in a signal (or a perceptual state) without needing to attribute
          knowledge of or access to that information to the containing system.  Dretske
          (1981) has provided a thorough analysis of the use of this notion of
          information to describe perceptual content.  On this way of viewing things, if
          perception of a particular hue is strictly correlated (under appropriate
          environmental background or "channel" conditions) with a particular
          reflectance distribution in the stimulus, then perception of that hue carries
          the information that the reflectance distribution is present (but see Hatfield
          1992a).  It can do so without the perceiver even knowing what a reflectance
          distribution is--for, as Dretske explains (1981, chap. 9), this notion of
          information is distinct from conceptual meaning.  But if so, then any
          supposition that the visual system "estimates" the physical properties of the
          distal stimulus from its "knowledge" of retinal values is thereby undercut.
          Inference and estimation are cognitive acts.  Our best philosophical and
          psychological accounts of such acts suggest that they occur through operations
          over premises that encode knowledge conceptually (Crane 1992, pp. 142-149;
          Smith 1995).  But the color constancy models mentioned above make no provision
          for that sort of cognitive act.  Hence, they would appear to be better classed
          as cases of the metaphorical application of an inferential model to
          perception.  The computational aspects of color vision would then be
          understood as cases of informational combination and transformation via
          noncognitive mechanisms.
          Phenomenal Experience
               The aim of much visual theory has been to explain the contents of
          phenomenal experience, the "way things look."  This has been the case in
          central areas of perceptual theory, such as the perception of spatial and
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          chromatic aspects of things.  To meet this explanatory aim an unconscious
          inference theory of perception must provide some explanation of how inferences
          yield phenomenal experience.  A complete explanation of the production of
          phenomenal experience would presuppose a solution to the mind-body problem.
          It would require explaining how perceptual processes in the brain produce
          phenomenal experience, which is a difficult problem.  But less ambitious
          explanatory agendas are available.  One might, for instance, posit
          psychophysical linking propositions (Teller & Pugh 1983), or psychoneural
          linking hypotheses (Hatfield & Pugh, unpublished), to bridge the gap between
          the brain states and experience, without thereby seeking to explain the
          ontology of such links.  Similarly, one might treat the conclusions of
          inferences as a certain kind of data array (Marr 1982, chap. 4; Tye 1991,
          chap. 5), and use the representational content of the data array to explain
          imagistic experience.
               Alhazen sought to explain the looks of things, as is apparent in his
          distinction between size as a function of visual angle and (phenomenally)
          perceived size.  I think he would have had little problem explaining the looks
          of things via judgment, since on his view the judgments of perception are not
          linguistic and they operate directly on phenomenally given materials.  He was,
          however, not explicit on how inferences operate on sensations to produce the
          ultimate looks of things.  Two possibilities suggest themselves: inferences
          operate either to transform the representation of spatial properties in
          sensation into a representation of perceived spatial properties, or inferences
          operate to create a new representation exhibiting the perceived properties.
          Leaving aside metaphysical difficulties about the status of phenomenal
          experience itself--which are common to all theories and remain unresolved--no
          special problem of phenomenal experience arises for Alhazen.
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               As we have seen in the previous section, perceptual theory from Descartes
          to Helmholtz retained phenomenally-defined theoretical primitives.  Descartes
          followed Alhazen and the optical tradition in conceiving the premises of
          perceptual inferences as graspings of phenomenally given sensations, and the
          conclusions of such inferences as phenomenal experiences.  The associationist
          tradition developed a finer analysis of the processes by which the spatial
          representations of perceptual experience are constructed from sensory
          elements.  Aspatial sensory elements are conjoined associatively to yield
          phenomenal representations of a three-dimensional visual world.  Although
          Helmholtz adopted an inferential account of perception, he offered a
          phenomenalist account of the conclusions of perceptual inferences.  Since he
          considered the conclusions of such inferences to be images, he left no gap
          between conclusion and experience.
               The notion that perceptual psychology attempts to explain the "looks of
          things" was fundamental to the work of the Gestalt psychologists (K"ohler 1929,
          chap. 1; Koffka 1935, chap. 1 and pp. 73-76), who used a principle of spatial
          isomorphism to explain how brain states are related to experience.  They
          argued that experience of voluminous shaped regions is produced by (or
          identical with) three-dimensional isomorphically shaped areas in the brain, so
          that the experience of a sphere is caused by a spherical region of brain
          activity.  Although the Gestaltists’ brain theory has been rejected, many
          investigators hold that phenomenal experience is a primary explanatory object
          for perceptual theory (Cutting 1986, p. 4, chap. 15; Gibson 1971, p. 4;
          Goldstein 1996, pp. 15, 29; Natsoulas 1991), though some disagree (for
          instance Kauffman 1974, p. 16).  Despite this explanatory goal, no detailed
          explanations of how the processes posited in perceptual theory yield the
          phenomenal aspects of sense perception are yet extant.  The strategy of
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          Helmholtz and his predecessors, of maintaining that perceptual experience is
          constructed from phenomenally characterized sensations, is no longer accepted.
          But no generally accepted model of how brain events are related to phenomenal
          experience has arisen to replace the one-fiber, one-sensation doctrine.
          Explaining phenomenal experience itself remains an unrealized goal of modern
          perceptual (and cognitive) theory.
               Some proposals have been made.  Wandell has offered the intriguing
          suggestion that phenomenal color, or color appearance, "is a mental
          explanation of why an object causes relatively more absorptions in one cone
          type than another object" (1995, p. 289). Although providing a detailed theory
          of how information about surface reflectance might be recovered (1995, chap.
          9), he does not offer anything further on the problem of how an estimation of
          a surface reflectance’s relative effect on a cone type yields the experience
          of color.
               Others have suggested that percepts are generated from early
          representations in the processing stream via cognitive, language-mediated
          processes.  In his 1975 book, Fodor conjectured that perceptual processes are
          initially carried out as operations on sentence-like objects, with images
          subsequently being constructed from symbolic descriptions.  He speculated that
          this construction might be likened to a "digital to analog" conversion (1975,
          p. 193, n. 26), but said nothing further about how this might occur.
               Rock (1975, chap. 11) was acutely aware of the need for and difficulty of
          explaining perceptual experience.  He considered percepts themselves to be
          "analogic, picturelike, and concrete" (1983, p. 52), by contrast with
          descriptions of percepts framed in the language of thought.  He clearly stated
          (1983, p. 272) that the outcome of perceptual inference "is a percept rather
          than a conclusion" (by which he meant a linguistically-expressed conclusion).
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          But he did not say how such percepts are generated from the unconscious
          descriptions found in perceptual inferences.
               Michael Tye (1995, chap. 5) has most fully elaborated a conception of how
          a language-like symbolist view of perceptual and imagistic representations
          might explain phenomenal experience.  Drawing on Marr (1982, chap. 4), he
          proposed that imagistic representations be conceived as symbol-filled arrays.
          Such arrays are formed from a matrix of cells that represent distal surface
          locations in two dimensions.  The individual cells (matrix units) are
          addressed by the relative positions they represent, corresponding to columns
          and rows.  The physical locations of the cells in the brain is irrelevant on
          Tye’s view; rather, the arrays are treated as having imagistic content in part
          because the processes operating over them treat the cells with numerically
          adjacent column and row addresses as if they were adjacent (1995, p. 94).
          Further imagistic content is provided by symbols within the cells, which
          represent the depth, color, intensity, and surface texture of a distal point
          (small area).  Full image content arises only when the arrays are associated
          with a sentential interpretation, such as "this represents a pig."  Our
          imagistic experience arises from the fact that we have symbolic
          representations of spatial, chromatic, and categorial aspects of things, which
          we access by symbol-reading processes that treat the areas represented in
          cells which have contiguous addresses as being distally contiguous.  An image
          is constituted by thousands of words, containing labels for spatial location
          attached to descriptions of depth and color.  The matrix arrays are not
          analog, but they do represent spatial relations of small areas that may be
          treated as forming a continuous surface.
               Tye’s view has the advantage that it can draw on ongoing work seeking to
          explain the production of the symbol-filled array, including Marr’s (1982)
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          explanations of the production of the "2 1/2-D sketch" (which was a model for
          Tye’s symbol-filled array).  But there remains a question of why Tye believes
          the postulated symbol-filled array explains phenomenal experience.  It is the
          array’s representational or informational content that does the work for Tye
          (1991, pp. 136, 142), and not any relation to neural states or to nonsymbolic
          mental states.  Specifically, Tye posits that phenomenal experience arises
          when we have symbolic-matrix representations of distal states that are ready
          to be taken up cognitively (e.g., brought under description).  As a
          description of the role that phenomenal experience itself might play in
          perception and cognition, as providing representations for further cognitive
          response, this strikes me as a good description.  But Tye intends it to
          explain our (apparent) phenomenal experience itself.  In the case of color
          vision, he says that phenomenal blue simply arises when we have symbolic
          states that represent distal blue things (1991, p. 133; 1995, pp. 145-147).
          He rejects sensations, qualia, or other mental items that might present
          phenomenal blue (1991, chap. 7).  The phenomenal blue, he explains, is not in
          the head, but is on the surfaces of things.  He is aware that the property
          possessed by some distal things, which makes them blue, is the physical
          property of having a spectral reflectance distribution that falls within a
          certain class of such distributions.  It is his view that a nonconceptual
          representation of this property in the visual system at a stage ready for
          conceptual description just is the perception of the distal blue surface in a
          phenomenally blue manner (1995, pp. 137-143).  No further explanation of the
          phenomenal content is given.
               Kosslyn (1995) surveyed the literature on visual imagery and proposed
          that there are two sorts of symbolic systems in the head: propositional and
          depictive.  Propositional representations consist of discrete symbols of
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          various classes (signifying entities, relations, properties, and logical
          relations), with rules for combining them.  The spatial relations among the
          symbols have only an arbitrary significance.  Property-symbols may always be
          written to the right of the entity symbols to which they apply, but this does
          not mean that they are on the right hand side of the entity!  By contrast,
          spatial relations of symbols in the depictive style of representation have
          that sort of nonarbitrary spatial meaning.  The depictive style of
          representation involves only two classes of symbols, points (small punctiform
          areas) and empty spaces.  The combination rules are merely that the symbols
          must be put in spatial relation to one another, and any relation is allowed
          (Kosslyn 1995, pp. 280-282).
               It is misleading for Kosslyn to label the points that compose his
          depictive representations "symbols," since no operations are defined which
          respond to the points based on variation in their form, as happens in
          classical symbol-processing models (Fodor 1975, chap. 2; Pylyshyn 1984, chap.
          3).  Indeed, Kosslyn seems to assume that noncognitive processes yield the
          depictive structure of the basic parts of images.  At least, in Kosslyn’s
          mature theory there is no discernible commitment to positing cognitive or
          inferential processes to generate the spatial relations internal to image
          parts.
13
  Interpretive processes then operate over spatial relations found in
          the image, which is composed of points in spatial arrangement (Kosslyn 1995,
          pp. 273-275).  The images are spatially concrete.  The potentially
          continuously varying spatial relations among points give them their content.
          Because continuous variation in spatial relations is permitted, the medium is
          _________________________
          13.  To put the point in Kosslyn’s technical vocabulary, there is no
          discernible commitment that the operations by which compressed images (1994,
          pp. 118-119) are used to reconstruct depictive representations are
          cognitive, though of course the decompression process may be initiated
          cognitively.
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          analog.
               Originally, Kosslyn (1983, p. 23) understood the spatial relations found
          in images to be a functional space consisting of paths of access among address
          labels for represented points as read by processing mechanisms (a conception
          similar to Tye’s symbol-filled array).  Neuroscientific findings led him to
          suggest that these functional relations may indeed be realized by real spatial
          relations in the cerebral cortex (Kosslyn 1995, pp. 290-2).  Although Kosslyn
          does not explicitly say so, he appears to suggest that the spatial relations
          experienced in images result from isomorphic spatial relations in the brain,
          presumably in accordance with a linking proposition (Teller & Pugh 1983).
          This proposal is similar to the Gestalt psychologists’ earlier postulation of
          a spatial isomorphism between brain events and the structure of perceptual
          experience (K"ohler 1929, pp. 61-66, 142-147; Koffka 1935, pp. 56-67; see also
          Scheerer 1994).  An extension of Kosslyn’s theory in this direction would
          yield a noncognitive principle of explanation for the spatial structure in
          phenomenal experience via spatially isomorphic patterns of activity in the
          brain.  If we treat linking propositions as hypothesized laws of nature, then
          the existence of spatially organized phenomenal experience is explained as the
          lawful product of the spatial properties of activity in certain areas of the
          brain.
               Stepping back, it would seem that the most promising route for
          inferential theories to explain the spatial structure of perception is the
          postulation of language-like inferential processes that produce analog or
          depictive representations.  If we give due regard to Rock’s and Fodor’s point
          about encapsulation, then these inferential processes would take place in a
          conceptually impoverished vocabulary, perhaps limited to spatial and chromatic
          properties and focusing on the production of a representation of the spatially
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          articulated surfaces of objects via a symbol-filled array.
               At present there is no worked out account of how an encapsulated
          inferential process would produce either a genuinely analog representation or
          one of Marr’s arrays.  Moreover, there are rival accounts of processing
          mechanisms that could yield analog representations without relying on a
          language-like or inferential medium.  Historically, the Gestalt theory of
          self-organizing dynamical systems in the brain provided a noncognitive basis
          for generating perceptual results (Hatfield & Epstein 1985, pp. 178-179).  In
          more recent times, connectionist models provide a conception of perceptual
          processing in which perceptual information can be combined in regular ways to
          yield analog representations, without positing cognitive operations such as
          inference (Hatfield 1988, 1991a & b).  To the extent that these rival accounts
          provide a means for modeling the production of analog representations, they go
          further than inferential accounts in addressing the production of the spatial
          structure of phenomenal experience.
                                            Conclusion
               Highly articulated theories of unconscious inference in perception have
          been extant for a thousand years (since Alhazen ca. 1030), and have been
          widespread for nearly four hundred years (following Descartes 1637).  The
          structure of the theories has varied, as can be seen by reviewing their
          various theoretical primitives, that is, what is taken as given as opposed to
          what needs an explanation.  Prior to the nineteenth century, the inferential
          machinery required to make unconscious inferences was taken as a given: it was
          the intellect, or the faculty of judgment.  Subsequently, various proposals
          were made to explain this machinery: via association in the case of Helmholtz,
          via an unconscious language of thought in the case of Fodor and Rock.  Prior
          to the latter twentieth century, it was assumed that the same concepts are
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          employed in unconscious inferences and conscious thought.  In recent decades,
          the fact that perception is often impervious to consciously entertained
          knowledge has led investigators to posit a separate, encapsulated domain of
          perceptual processing, which must then be supplied with its own cognitive
          resources.  Finally, prior to the twentieth century the primitive elements
          posited in perceptual theories were sensations with phenomenal properties.
          Processes were then posited to augment or transform those properties, for
          example, by ordering the sensations spatially.  In the twentieth century such
          sensational primitives have been rejected.  For contemporary unconscious
          inference theories, the problem then arises of explaining how linguistic
          inferential processes can yield the phenomenal aspects of perceptual
          experience.
               The literature of artificial intelligence and computational accounts of
          vision is replete with talk of "descriptions" and "inferences."  In some
          cases, such as Marr (1982, pp. 342-344), the approach has been allied with a
          Fodorean conception of symbolic computation.  But in many cases no real
          support is given for such talk.  It is as if causal transitions among
          information-bearing states of a system that occur according to rules and that
          lead to appropriate outcomes should be counted as inferences on the face of
          it, without supplying cognitive machinery or making provision to explain the
          conceptual content found in the inferences.  As we found with the work on
          color constancy discussed above, such discussions are best classed as
          metaphorical uses of the concepts of inference and description.  They are not
          inferential theories of perception, but theories of information transformation
          in perception.14  The problem with taking these positions as literal inference
          _________________________
          14.  It is possible to read this literature as implicitly proposing that all
          inference should be treated as information transformation, without worrying
          about the system’s sensitivity to the content of the information.  More
          generally, it seems clear that Horace Barlow (1974, 1990) adopts the
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          theories is that they make no provision for the cognitive resources that would
          be needed to sustain unconscious inferences.
               Literal theories of perceptual inference that do posit cognitive
          resources, in the manner of Fodor (1983) and Rock (1983), have the opposite
          problem.  They need to defend their invocation of cognitive apparatus to carry
          out rule-based transformations on information-bearing states in perception.
          Recall that our discussion has been limited to the phenomenal aspects of sense
          perception, that is, to the generation of imagistic perceptual
          representations.  Rock argues that the outcomes of perception are clever
          enough to require truly intelligent (or at least genuinely cognitive)
          mechanisms in their production.  The question of whether "smart mechanisms"
          must simply be engineered smartly (or evolved "smartly"), or must contain
          genuinely cognitive apparatus, is of great interest (Runeson 1977).  More
          generally, it would be interesting to contemplate similarities and differences
          among the various processes by which sensory information is encoded,
          perceptions are formed and brought under concepts, words are applied to
          perceptions, and meanings of words are altered on empirical (inductive)
          grounds (Barlow 1974, p. 132).  But for present purposes it will be enough to
          consider briefly an alternative means for conceiving perceptual processes
          noncognitively.
               One of the reasons that unconscious inference models are attractive is
          _________________________
          attitude that mechanisms of information transformation, from the bacterium
          to the human, are best treated as a lying on a continuum, with no in
          principle dividing line separating the processes and marking off what I have
          called concept-mediated inferences from the "inferences" of the bacterium.
          This line of thought is of great interest.  At the same time, without
          further articulation and defense of its claims about continuity, it would
          seem to slip into panmentalism; for it equates thought content with
          information transformations of any kind, and so does not account for the
          internal structure of conceptual thought (see Dretske 1981) that
          distinguishes cognitive beings from computer keyboards.
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          that perception is mental and involves transformations of information in
          accordance with rules.  It has seemed reasonable or even necessary that the
          rules would be represented and applied by a cognitive apparatus.  But the
          development of connectionist computational architectures provides a means of
          conceiving of rules for information transformation that are instantiated in
          neural nets, without being cognitively represented and accessed.
          Connectionist models can treat information processing in perception as the
          outcome of stimulus driven inputs to nodes in a connectionist net and the
          subsequent settling down of that net (or one downstream) into a stable state.
          Spatial information might be carried in such nets by adjacency relations
          within a retinotopic projection (Bienenstock & Doursat 1991).  By organizing a
          pyramid of nets that respond to the spatial properties of represented images
          at many different scales, local computations can respond to global features of
          images in a reasonable number of steps (Rosenfeld 1990).  Within the
          connectionist framework it is possible to think of networks of nodes as
          instantiating processing rules (Hatfield 1991a) without representing those
          rules in explicit symbolic form or operating upon them via language-like
          inferential apparatus.  Because such nets process information in accordance
          with rules without the necessity that the stimulus be described internally in
          a conceptual vocabulary (however modest), such models are noncognitive
          (Hatfield 1988).  For basic sensory processes, evolutionary engineering
          presumably has shaped the instantiated rules.  Marr’s (1982) theory of early
          vision, long a bastion of symbolist and inferential conceptions of
          psychological processes, admits of a nonsymbolic, noncognitive connectionist
          interpretation (Hatfield 1991b; Kosslyn & Hatfield 1984).
               Noncognitive models of sense perception face (counterparts to) only two
          of the three problems discussed herein.  As the complement of the cognitive
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          machinery problem, they must provide computational machinery to explain
          transformations among perceptual representations.  As the complement to the
          phenomenal experience problem, they must explain how the phenomenal aspects of
          sensory perception arise from noncognitive processes and operations.  They are
          not faced with the sophisticated content problem in relation to sense
          perception, since they do not posit cognitive operations that represent
          conceptual content (sophisticated or no) in their explanations.  Connectionist
          versions of noncognitive theories do, of course, face the problem of
          sophisticated content in framing explanations of cognitive achievements such
          as object recognition.  They will in that case need to provide their own
          models of conceptual content and object recognition (on which, see Quinlan
          1991, pp. 120-131).
               The previous hegemony of inferential models of the psychological
          processes underlying sense perception (by contrast with cognitive or
          meaningful perception) has fallen subject to challenge (Epstein 1993; Hatfield
          1988; Kanizsa 1979, chap. 1; 1985).  The fate of inferential models will be
          decided in the longer course of empirical research and theoretical assessment.
          It is clear that the mere presence of specified processing rules or of
          "clever" perceptual outcomes cannot support the theory that sense perception
          results from inference, to the exclusion of noncognitive theories.  Although
          seeing usually leads to believing, it remains an open question whether simple
          seeing results from belief-like inferences.  The slow movement of theory is
          towards thinking it does not.
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